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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY - INDEMNITY - SHIPOWNER ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM
STEVEDORE COMPANY FOR VESSEL'S LIABILITY TO AN INJURED STEVEDORE. - A
proceeding in rem was brought in admiralty by a stevedore to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained from a falling boom while the vessel was being unloaded at
a berth. The vessel's owners had chartered the ship to a third party, which entered into
a stevedoring service agreement with the stevedore's employer. The vessel impleaded
the stevedore company. The district court found the vessel unseaworthy and therefore
liable, but it also held that the vessel was entitled to reimbursement from the stevedore
company for its liability to the stevedore, since it was the company's negligence which
constituted the "sole", "active", or "primary cause" of the fall of the boom.' The Third
Circuit reversed, finding that the vessel was seaworthy and that the sole cause of the
injury was the negligence of the stevedoring crew. This holding made it unnecessary to
reach the issue of reimbursement. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, reversed.
A vessel, chartered to a third party, and liable in rem to a stevedore because of his
employer's failure to properly perform its service agreement with the third party, may
obtain reimbursement from that employer, since its breach of contract gave rise to the
liability. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
In recent years the topic of contribution and indemnity between joint tortfeasors
has attained special significance in connection with injuries to stevedores while working
on vessels. Prior to the decision by the Supreme Court in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,3
the duty of the vessel to the stevedore on board was only to furnish a safe place to work
and to exercise due care.4 The vessel's responsibility to the stevedores on board was
greatly expanded in Sieracki which held that the warranty by the shipowner that the
vessel was seaworthy, previously recognized as owed only to the crew,5 extends to the
stevedores. This means that the duty of the vessel to the stevedore now includes a species
of liability without fault. This extension was characterized in Sieracki as "presenting to
[stevedores] ... paid-up accident insurance policies at the expense of a vessel by which
they have not been employed." 6 Its impact has since been accentuated by Alaska S.S.
Co. v. Petterson,7 which held that the warranty of seaworthiness by the vessel extends
even to gear furnished by the stevedore-employer, and by Grillea v. United States,8
which held that a vessel is unseaworthy and therefore liable to an injured stevedore,
even though it was rendered unseaworthy by the stevedore or a fellow-stevedore's own
prior acts. These new rules and the nature of the stevedore's activities have multiplied
the number of cases in which the vessel's liability is in whole or part created by the
conduct of the stevedores themselves. The natural result is an increase in the number
of cases in which the vessel is held liable to the stevedore and seeks reimbursement
from the stevedore's employer.9
1 142 F. Supp. 389 (D.N.J. 1956).
2 249 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957).
a 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
4 79 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1935); See also 19 TEMP. L.Q. 339 (1945), which states,
The majority of decisions seem to hold that the duty owed by the owner [of the
vessel] to the employee of the stevedore is only that of reasonable care, such as
would be extended to a business guest by the occupier of the premises.
5 The Howell, 273 Fed. 513 (2d Cir. 1921). See also The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
6 328 U.S. 85, 107 (1946) (dissenting opinion); cf. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96
(1944).
-7 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
8 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
(576)
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Contribution, at first blush, would seem to be the most reasonable remedy. This
would permit a proration of the damages between the joint tortfeasors, the vessel and
the stevedore company. But for two reasons the law does not permit contribution. The
first reason is statutory. Congress, by the enactment of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,' 0 provided compensation by the employer to the injured
stevedore and also protected the employer from tort suits by the stevedore." But this
did not bar the stevedore from suing the vessel for failure to furnish him a safe place
to work, or for unseaworthiness.' 2 The vessel is then not permitted to implead the
stevedore-employer as a joint tortfeasor, as under the act, the stevedore-employer cannot
be sued in tort by the stevedore. 13 The claim of the stevedore against the stevedore-
employer is strictly limited to statutory benefits. The second reason is in case law. In
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,' 4 the Supreme Court declined
to recognize judicially the doctrine of contribution between joint tortfeasors as a
vessel's remedy against a stevedore's employer. It held in Halcyon that, while admiralty
provided for equal sharing of damages and liability in collision cases, the Court had
never expressly applied it to non-collision cases. It concluded that it would be more
properly within the purview of legislative function to fashion new rules of contribution
between joint tort-feasors. Halcyon represents the law today, i.e., that the vessel cannot
recover in tort from the employer.15
However, if the employer has breached an independent contractual duty owed to
the vessel, the case may be on a different footing. If the employer's relation to the
vessel is that of a contractor working for the vessel, there may be an implied obligation
to exercise due care both in handling cargo, 16 and using incidental equipment.17 In the
instant case, the Supreme Court regarded the vessel as a third-party beneficiary's of
9 At one time by reason of the so-called "control test," a vessel was able to escape liability to a
person injured if its unseaworthiness resulted from the fault of persons other than the vessel or its
crew, particularily when the damage resulted from the improper use of equipment which was not
under its control. The Hindustan, 37 F.2d 932 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd per curiam sub nom. Bossie v. The
S.S. Hindustan, 44 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir, 1930). That doctrine, however, was determined to be erroneous
in Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), and no longer can be used to exonerate the vessel, Feinman v. A. H.
Bull S.S. Co., 216 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1954).
10 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904-05 (1952). Section 904(a) reads: "Every employer
shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees...;" and § 905: "The liability of
an employer prescribed in section 904 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer
at law or in admiralty on account of such injury .. " (Emphasis added.)
11 In S. Rm,. No. 973, 69 Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926), regarding the act, the following comment
appears:
Sections [90] (4), [90] (5), and [90] (6) of the bill contain the appropriate pro-
visions for making certain that the compensation will be paid, abolishing liability
on the part of the employer except for the payment of the prescribed compensation,
and fixing the time at which compensation begins. (Emphasis added.)
12 American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 454-456 (1947).
13 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.21 (1952).
14 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
15 Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954); Union Sulphur & Oil Corp. v. W. 3. Jones
& Son, 195 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1952); cf. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at § 76.21:
The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose concurring
negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or joined by the
third party as a joint tort-feasor, whether under contribution statutes or at common
law.
16 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
17 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating-Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567 (1958).
18 The third-party beneficiary doctrine has been frequently applied in the maritime law. Hagan
v. Scottish Ins. Co., 186 U.S. 423 (1902); The John Russel, 68 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1934); Munich Assur.
Co. v. Dodwell & Co., 128 Fed. 410 (9th Cir. 1904), cert. denied, 195 U.S. 629 (1904). (third-
party beneficiaries of marine insurance policies). O'Rourke v. Peck, 29 Fed. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1886)
(third-party beneficiary of covenant to repair dock). Reliance Marine Transp. & Constr. Corp., 89
F. Supp. 272, 277-78 (D. Conn. 1950), modified 206 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1953) (third-party beneficiary
of warranty of seaworthiness).
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circumstances surrounding the stevedoring contract indicated that the vessel itself
could be regarded as an intended beneficiary of the employer's warranty of workman-
the stevedoring contract between the employer and the charterer of the vessel.' 9 The
like service. 20 The vessel was named in the contract. The employer was performing, on
behalf of the vessel, a duty - nondelegable in nature - for the breach of which the ves-
sel remained responsible. 21 The necessary effect of a breach of the employer's contractual
undertaking, therefore, was to subject the vessel to liability. This must have been in the
contemplation of the charterer and the employer at the time of the contract. It further
appears that the vessel would be entitled to hold the charterer responsible for the
damages incurred during the term of the charter.2 2 Accordingly, the charterer would be
entitled, in turn, to throw its loss back on the stevedore-employer. 28 Hence, by allowing
the vessel directly to obtain reimbursement from the stevedore-employer in this proceed-
ing, the much desired result - espeially in admiralty - of avoiding circuitous actions
is accomplished. 24
It is apparent that reimbursement from the stevedore-employer in this manner
accomplishes what cannot be done directly since the employee's recovery and the
stevedore-employer's liability is not limited to the amount provided in the act. Perhaps
this evades the spirit of the legislation, but the employee's right to recovery against un-
seaworthy vessels is preserved. Still, the rights between the unseaworthy vessel and the
negligent stevedore-employer which brought this unseaworthiness into play should be
fairly adjusted. As indicated above, the reasonable way would be to permit contribution.
Then the risk could be divided between the vessel and the stevedore-employer according
to the equities of each case. The present sentiment of the Court against contribution is
unfortunate. Under the present law, absent a contractual relationship, the vessel has no
ground for reimbursement; 25 it must carry the full burden of the loss. Yet, when there
is a contractual relationship the vessel is reimbursed in full and the stevedore-employer
bears the entire burden. Contribution would permit a division of the risk according to
the degree of fault of each responsible party, unless they contract otherwise. As seen
in the instant case, the Court will go far to find a contractual relationship. Under the
shadow of Halcyon and the Compensation act, the remedy is the fairest the Supreme
Court could have given.
William J. Gerardo
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JENCKS RULE IN STATE COURTS - JENCKS IS NOT A
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. - Defendant was convicted of assault and battery with
intent to commit murder. During the trial, defendant's counsel moved for production
of police reports of statements made by the prosecuting witnesses. The defense counsel
made no showing that the prior statements were in conflict with the direct testimony of
the prosecution's witnesses on the stand or that they would prove the innocence of the
accused. The trial court overruled his motion. On appeal, defendant contended that
19 American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 456 (1947); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek,
234 U.S. 52, 62 (1914).
20 For a general discussion of third-party beneficiaries, see generally 4 CoPMN, CONTRACTS,
§§ 772-855, (1951); 2 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 347-403, (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATE ENT, CON-
TRACTS, §§ 133-147, (1932).
21 See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 89-96 (1946).
22 See The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464 (1901).
23 United States v. The Helen, 164 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1947).
24 See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. British Transp.
Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957).
25 King v. Waterman S.S. Corp., Civil No. 12, 537, 3d Cir., Dec. 1, 1959.
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the Supreme Court, in Jencks v. United States,' held that a defendant in a criminal
trial had a constitutional right to inspect the prosecution's reports of a witness' pre-
trial statements notwithstanding a failure to show any conflict in the witness' testimony
and the reports. 2 Held, conviction affirmed. The Jencks case is not binding upon
Indiana criminal procedure which does not require production of such reports without
a showing that they contradict the witness' testimony. Anderson v. State, 156 N.E.2d
384 (Ind. 1959).
At common law, an accused was not permitted to require production of prior
statements of the prosecution's witnesses. 3 Many states hold that the production of
pre-trial statements upon a proper showing that they contradict testimony of a witness
is only a privilege accorded to the defendant, and if the trial judge, after an inspection
of the statements, refuses production without injury to the defense, the refusal is
harmless error.4 Conversely, a number of jurisdictions feel that the defendant has a
right to the production of the pre-trial statements for inspection, if the defense counsel
supports the request with a showing of conflict of testimony.5 Michigan courts for
many years have not demanded a foundation for the impeachment of the prosecution
witness' direct testimony as a requisite for the right to compel production. 6 Indiana, it
seems, was with the majority prior to the instant case,7 although the instant court
cited no controlling state precedent in its decision.8
In Jencks v. United States,9 the Supreme Court held that the trial court was in
error for requiring defendant's counsel to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency
between pre-trial statements and the trial testimony of the government's witness in order
to obtain the production of the pre-trial statements. The majority reasoned that the re-
quirement of a showing of confllict was incompatible with the "standards for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected."' 0
This statement, quoted out of context from the full opinion, would seem to indicate that
the holding was not based on constitutional grounds. However, there may be a deeper
foundation for Jencks than a surface appraisal reveals. Three months after the Supreme
Court decided Jencks, Congress put its basic holding into statutory form," but ex-
pressly indicated that the statute was not intended to nullify or limit the Jencks decision
in so far as due process was concerned; its purpose was merely to preclude the possibility
of the decision's misinterpretation in the federal courts.' 2 The expressed basis of the
Jencks holding, that "justice requires no less,"' 3 may be constitutional and thereby
binding upon the states under due process of law.
The due process clause in the fourteenth amendment protects the individual
against state oppression, but it has historically been held not to be an equivalent of the
1 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2 Two other issues argued on this appeal were that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's
motion to quash the affidavit and that the verdict of the trial court was contrary to law and was not
sustained by sufficient evidence. The instant court upheld the trial court on both issues. The scope of
this article does not include a discussion of these rulings.
3 6 WiOMoRE, EVEDENcE § 1859(g) (3d ed. 1940).
4 E.g., People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957);
State v. Pambianchi, 139 Conn. 543, 95 A.2d 695 (1953); State v. Bachman, 41 Nev. 197, 168 Pac.
733 (1917); Funk v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 402, 208 S.W. 509 (1919); Alto v. State, 215 Wis. 141,
253 N.W. 777 (1934).
5 E.g., People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957); State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95
So. 2d 305 (1957); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).
6 People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594, 598 (1933).
7 See Key v. State, 235 Ind. 172, 132 N.E.2d 143 (1956); Leach v. State, 177 Ind. 234, 97 N.E.
792 (1912).
8 156 N.E.2d at 386.
9 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
10 Id. at 668.
11 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
12 S. REP. No. 981, 85 Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1957). See United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp.
621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (§ 3500 is not unconstitutional).
13 Iencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957).
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first eight amendments which protect the individual against oppression by the federal
government. 14 In criminal prosecutions, the concept of due process "exacts from the
States for the lowliest and the most outcast all that is 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' "15 However, this does not require the states to conform their criminal
procedure to the federal procedure; due process rather has had the effect of permitting
the state to establish, maintain, and accustom its people to the particular state's own
form of due process of law.16 In reality, the Supreme Court has stated, the "purpose
of due process is not to protect an accused against a proper conviction but against an
unfair conviction.' 7 This substantially was the premise the instant court relied on in
holding that its procedure provided due process.' s
The question of the applicability of the Jencks rule has arisen in a few other
states. In Delaware, Jencks has not been applied, but a few decisions have referred to
it as applicable. However, mention of the Jencks ruling as constitutionally required
was avoided. 19 New Jersey has applied the Jencks ruling because of its persuasive force
and underlying principle of broad disclosure, but not because of a constitutional inter-
pretation.20 In decisions subsequent to Jencks, Mississippi and apparently Oklahoma
adhere to the old rulings that the defense counsel must lay a foundation before de-
manding production; in neither decision was Jencks mentioned.2 1 A New York decision
expressly rejected the applicability of Jencks to state procedure.2 2 The state courts,
therefore, have failed to find a binding constitutional mandate in Jencks. The federal
courts, on the other hand, have dutifully applied Jencks, but agree that it is not a
constitutional requirement. 23 In Riser v. Teets,24 the due process question in Jencks
was explored and evidently rejected with the statement that the "standard announced
is one for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts ... "25 The majority
then upheld a California decision2 6 requiring the defense to show conflict in testimony
to obtain pre-trial statements. The dissent in the case reasoned that the right of the
defendant to demand production regardless of a showing of conflict is inherent in the
sixth amendment guaranteeing the right of an accused "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." 27 Assuming the validity of this analysis, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would include this guarantee as an element of that "ordered
liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment.
However, this reasoning suggests another factor strengthening the possibility that
Jencks is actually a constitutional mandate. The cross-examination of a witness is a
14 E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See
generally, Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. Rnv.
5 (1949). But see Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 303 (1959).
15 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 26-27.
16 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 653-56 (1948).
17 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 57 (1947).
18 156 N.E.2d at 385-86.
19 State v. Hutchins, 138 A.2d 342, 346 (Del. Super. 1957); State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456,
134 A.2d 266 (1957).
20 State v. Hunt, 25 NJ. 514, 138 A.2d 1, 10 (1958).
21 Bellew v. State, 106 So. 2d 146, 155-56 (Miss. 1958); cf. State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319
P.2d 610, 614 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (dictum).
22 People v. Marshall, 5 App. Div. 2d 352, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 237 (1958).
23 In Indiviglio v. United States, 249 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1957), the Fifth Circuit limited Jencks
and held that production without a showing of contradiction was not binding upon federal courts.
The case was reversed per curiam by the Supreme Court, 357 U.S. 574 (1958), citing Jencks. See
United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747, 748 (D.N.J. 1958); United States v. Grunewald, 162
F. Supp. 621 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (doctrinal trend of liberalization of federal criminal procedure for
defendant indicated).
24 Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958).
25 Id. at 846.
26 People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
27 Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844, 847. (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958). See United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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matter of right under due process. 2 8 The purpose of cross-examination of an adverse
witness is not only to modify, clarify, and explain direct testimony, but to destroy it if
possible.2 9 In People v. Dellabonda,30 which held as the Supreme Court in Jencks and
to which Mr. Justice Brennan referred,3z the Michigan court emphasized that the right
to cross-examine includes a right to draw out from the prosecution's witness and lay
before the jury anything tending to elucidate or affect the credibility of the adverse
witness.3 2 In Alford v. United States,33 the Supreme Court stated, "It is the essence of
a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is
unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop.
'3 4
This argument may have influenced the court in Jencks in formulating its broad rule of
production for the federal courts. But the Jencks inspection rule is analogous in many
respects to the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States.35 Although the Supreme
Court has found due process to forbid unreasonable search and seizure in states, it has
not required the state courts to exclude such illegally obtained evidence.36 The ex-
clusionary rule itself is not a substantial right, but merely one of the many remedies to
give effect to due process, and the states are free to utilize others in its place.37 Similarly,
although cross-examination is considered a right secured by the due process provision,
it has been subject to fair and reasonable limits within the discretion of the trial judge
and as required by the procedure of the jurisdiction.38 From the example of the treat-
ment of the federal exclusionary rule, it is submitted that although the Supreme Court
believes the Jencks inspection rule is the procedure most likely to result in justice, it
will not consider the rule on essential element of "ordered liberty" and force it on
the states.
The instant court followed the weight of authority in concluding that the Supreme
Court in Jencks was merely establishing another rule of criminal procedure for the
federal courts. Apparently, the court has adopted the rule that the accused must first
show conflict between the statements he intends to inspect and the courtroom testimony
of the witnesses who gave the statements. It grounded the decision on the policy that
the prosecution of criminals is extremely difficult and that justice does not require that
"the state open its confidential files to the accused."3 9 But the instant court's concept
of justice is not as compelling as that of the Supreme Court in Jencks. It is extremely
difficult, and often impossible, for a defense counsel to point out conflict between the
witness' testimony and his pre-trial statements when those statements are in the ex-
clusive possession of the prosecution. Certainly, Indiana's police records are not as
important as the FBI reports which in federal courts are no longer privileged on
relevant matters.40
Thomas M. Clusserath
28 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Heard v. United States, 255 Fed. 829 (8th Cir.
1919); Henry v. State, 196 Ind. 14, 146 N.E. 822 (1925); State v. Zolantakis, 79 Utah 296, 259 Pac.
1044 (1927).
29 State v. Zolantakis, supra note 28, at 1047.
30 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594 (1933).
31 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957).
32 People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594, 598 (1933).
33 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
34 Id. at 692.
35 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
36 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
37 Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 36, at 28.
38 See People v. Godsey, 334 111. 11, 165 N.E. 178, 180 (1929); Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296
N.Y. 347, 73 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1947); State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604, 616 (1950).
39 156 N.E.2d at 386.
40 Mr. Justice Clark, although dissenting in Jencks, felt that the inspection rule would be reason-
able in state criminal proceedings where the prosecution's files are not connected with foreign
relations, national defense, sabotage and espionage. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681 (1957).
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FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT - RECOVERY By ILLEGITIMATE CHILD FOR
DEATH op WORKMAN FATHER. Decedent's widow brought an action on separate claims
against the defendants under the wrongful death statute of New Jersey and the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA). The guardian ad litem of five alleged minor illegiti-
mate children of the decedent was permitted to intervene in the FELA claim., Upon
motion to dismiss the minor's complaint, held, complaint dismissed. Illegitimate children
can not recover under FELA for the negligent killing of their putative father since they
are not "children" within the meaning of the act. Hammond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 148
A.2d 515 (N.J. Super. 1959).
Under the FELA, in case of the death of one of its employees, a negligent com-
mon carrier is liable to the personal representative "for the benefit of the surviving
widow and children of such employee."' 2 (Emphasis added). Since the children in the
instant case were admittedly illegitimate, the court was faced with a problem of statutory
construction. Historically, however, the common law excluded the illegitimate from
the term "children." An illegitimate child was considered a nullius filius, the son of no
one.3 This fiction was developed from the law of inheritance and descent. Since the
bastard was kin to no one, he had no right of inheritance, and only his wife and the
heirs of his body could inherit from him. This development occurred in an era when
land was the source of not only all wealth, but also all powers of government. 4 A cer-
tainty of descent in in heritance was a necessity for the maintenance of an orderly
state. The fiction, strengthened through the years, is now the foundation of the general
rule that the word "child" or "children" when used in wills, 5 deeds, 6 and statutes7
refers only to legitimate children. This general rule has retained surprising vitality,
notwithstanding the advent of wrongful death statutes, s workmen's compensation acts,9
and other remedial legislation, such as the FELA,10 the whole purpose of which is to
provide for the support of dependents after a person's death.
In 1863 the wrongful death act, Lord Campbell's Act," was interpreted as ex-
cluding illegitimate children. 12 The basis of this decision was the ancient concept of
nullius filius as it was applied to the law of descent and distribution. It has been followed
in the great majority of jurisdictions which take the position that legislatures intend the
words "child" and "children" to have legal meaning.13
1 The guardian admitted that the illegitimate children were not proper parties plaintiffs in the
wrongful death action.
2 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
3 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 459. See Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619
(1923): "He was nullius flius... of no father and no mother, that is to say, it (the common law)
closed its eyes to the fact of that relation and in legal aspect ignored its existence."
4 See STEVENsON, MEDIAEVAL HISTORY 182 (3d ed. 1951).
5 Wilson v. Ingram, 207 Ga. 271, 61 S.E. 2d 126 (1950); see Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 372 IM. 622,
25 N.E.2d 67 (1939); Scarborough v. Scarborough, 134 N.J.E. 201, 34 A.2d 791 (1943); 3 PAGE,
WILLs 147 (3d Lifetime ed. 1941).
6 Johnstone v. Taliaferro, 107 Ga. 6, 32 S.E. 931 (1899); Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 11. 544, 21
N.E. 430 (1889); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 286 (1940).
7 Brindly v. Dixie Const. Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E.2d 267 (1949); Jung v. St. Paul Fire Dept.
Relief Ass'n., 223 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d 151 (1947).
8 See, e.g., Adams v. Powell, 67 Ga. App. 460, 21 S.E.2d 111 (1942); Smith v. Hagerstown &
Frederick Ry. Co., 139 Md. 78, 114 Ad. 729 (1921); Goods v. Towns, 56 Vt. 410 (1883).
9 Murrell v. Industrial Comm'n., 291 II. 334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920); Bell v. Terry & Tench Co.,
117 App. Div. 123, 163 N.Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1917). But see Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n.,
342 IIl. 400, 174 N.E. 534 (1934) (mother of illegitimate child is a "parent" within the meaning of
the act).
10 See Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489 (1916); Hiser v. Davis, 234 N.Y. 300,
137 N.E. 596 (1922) (illegitimate is not "next of kin").
11 Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93. But see the Law Reform Act, 1934, 24 & 25
Geo. 5, c. 41, where the Fatal Accidents Acts are amended so that "any illegitimate person . . .
shall be treated as being, or as having been, the legitimate offspring of his mother and reputed
father...."
12 Bickinson v. Northeastern Ry., 9 L.T.R. (N.S.) 299, 159 Eng. Rep. 304 (Ex. 1863).
13 See cases cited in note 8 supra; BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAws 177-178 (2d ed. 1911).
RECENT DECISIONS
State workmen's compensation statutes have been similarly interpreted for similar
reasons.14 Some courts by viewing the family as a natural instead of legal relation have
granted recovery in cases where the beneficiary had been living with the deceased as a
member of his family, although the relationship had never been legalized. 15 The remedial
nature of the act has persuaded a few courts, however, to allow the illegitimate to
recover under the terms of the statutes. The Kansas Supreme Court in holding that an
illegitimate child was included in a workmen's compensation statute, specifically defining
"child,"' 6 but neglecting to include the illegitimate,' 7 looked not to the common law
definition, nor to the descent and distribution statutes of the state, but to the general
public policy of the state expressed by a previous decision' s which gave illegitimate
children the right to be supported by their parents. Where the parents of illegitimate
children are bound to educate and support them, such children, it seems, may recover
for the wrongful death of their parents. Since it is the purpose of the workmen's com-
pensation act to place the burden of induitrial accidents on industry, it would be a
frustration of that purpose to compel illegitimate children individually, or the state, to
carry the burden.
In general, the words of beneficiary, such as widow, widower, next of kin, and
children, in federal remedial statutes are determined by state law.' 9 It is not surprising
then that the Supreme Court, in Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. Kenney,20 faced with the
choice of using either the state descent and distribution statute or the ancient common
law of England as a basis for interpreting the phrase "next of kin," in the FELA, chose
state law. However, in Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,21 a leading case liberally
interpreting the beneficiary phrases of the Federal Death Act, illegitimate children were
held to be "dependent relatives." Although, because of the admiralty character of the
Federal Death Act,22 it is not strong authority for a similar interpretation of federal
remedial statutes dealing with deaths on land, its language is broad enough to be
persuasive. After pointing out that the legal definition of "child" is based on the law of
inheritance, the opinion states: 'There is no right of inheritance involved here. It is a
statute that confers recovery upon dependents, not for the benefit of the estate, but for
those who by our standards are legally or morally entitled to support." 23
In the present case the court followed Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. Kenney paraphras-
ing: Plainly the statute contains no definition of the word "children." Speaking generally,
under our dual system of government who are embraced within words "child" or
14 See cases cited in note 9 supra. But see Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920)
(illegitimate members of household, although not "children," qualify as "dependents"); Smonekar
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 137 Pa. Super. 183, 8 A.2d 461 (1939) (if child is a member of
household, he can recover).
15 Taber v. Industrial Comm'n, 352 M1l. 115, 182 N.E. 255 (1933).
16 KANsAs GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-508 (1949).
37 Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 189 P.2d 892 (1948).
18 Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
19 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S.
489 (1916).
20 240 U.S. 489, 494 (1916).
The truth of this view (that state law applies) will be at once additionally apparent
by considering the far reaching consequence of the proposition (that common law
applies) since if it be well founded, it would apply equally to the other require-
ments of the statute - to the provision as to the surviving widow, the husband and
children, and to parents, thus for the purpose of the enforcement of the act over-
throwing the legislature of the State on subjects of the most intimate domestic
character and substituting for it the common law as stereotyped at the, time of
separation.
21 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934).
22 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761. ". . .for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife,
husband, parent, child, or dependant relative.... ." (Emphasis added).
23 70 F.2d 326, 329 (2d. Cir. 1934).
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"children" is to be determined by the legislation of the various states to whose
authority the subject is normally committed. The absence of a definition indicates the
intention of Congress to permit the determination of that question according to state
law.2 4
By examining the New Jersey law of descent and distribution 2 5 the court found that an
illegitimate child has no right of inheritance from his father and is not considered a
legal "child." It correctly found that the terms of beneficiary of the FELA have always
been interpreted by state law. It seems strange, however, to apply the state law of
descent and distribution to a statute whose purpose is quite different from inheritance.
In De Sylvia v. Ballentine,2 6 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of
whether an illegitimate child of a deceased author had a right to renew his father's copy-
right under the Copyright Act 2 7 which gives the author's "children" such a right. It
held that although under the law of his state the child was not legitimate for all pur-
poses, he should be granted the renewal right, because under state law he was given the
right of inheritance from his father. The court looked to the nature of the statute and
reasoned, "This is really a case of descent of property, and we think the controlling
question under state law should be whether the child would be an heir of the author."
'28
The nature of the FELA is not that of inheritance, but it is remedial statute, the
purpose of which is to give compensation for loss of support.2 9 When interpreting the
FELA "the controlling question under state law" should be not whether the child has
the right of inheritance for the deceased, but rather whether the child has the right of
support from the deceased. Instead of using the New Jersey descent and distribution
statute as the applicable state law defining "children" the court in the present case
could have better used the New Jersey statute giving an illegitimate child the right to
his father's support.3 0
Roderick A. Mette
LABOR LAW - RAILWAY LABOR ACT - UNION SHOP AGREEMENT HELD EN-
FORCEABLE DESPITE USE OF FUNDS By UNION FOR POLITICAL EXPENDITURE. -
Respondents, railway employees, sought to restrain enforcement of a union shop con-
tract requiring them to make payments of dues, fees and assessments. Failing this,
alternative relief was requested to restrict the use of such dues to purposes reasonably
necessary or related to collective bargaining. The jury determined that funds obtained
from dues and fees were used to support legislation and influence voting in elections to
public office, and that such activities were not reasonably related or necessary to
collective bargaining. A restraining order was then granted until the unions could
establish what portion of dues and fees was used for purposes reasonably related to
collective bargaining. The unions appealed, held, reversed. The union shop contract
was enforceable despite use of dues and fees for supporting legislation and influencing
political campaigns. Allen v. Southern Ry., 107 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 1959).
24 Hammond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 148 A.2d 515, 517 (NJ. Super. 1959).
25 N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A: 4-7 (1951). See Bartholdi v. Dumbeky, 37 N.J. Super. 418, 117 A.2d
518 (1955); Bank of Montclair v. McCutcheon, 107 N.J. 564, 152 Ati. 379 (1930).
26 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
27 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952).
28 De Sylvia v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
29 See generally, St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 187 Fed. 949 (8th Cir. 1911); Bocook
v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 67 Fed. Supp. 154 (E.D. Ky. 1946); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Shober, 38 Ohio App. 216, 176 N.E. 88 (1930).
30 N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:16-2 (1937): "A child born out of wedlock shall be entitled to support
from his father and mother to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock."
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Recent controversy regarding union shop contracts involving railroads stems
basically from two factors. The first is the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act,'
permitting carriers and labor organizations to enter into union shop contracts "not-
withstanding any other provision . . . of any state." The second is the subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in Railway Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson.
2 This
case arose when employees of the Sante Fe railroad, not desiring a union, sought to
enjoin the enforcement of union shop agreements between the railroad and certain
labor organizations. The employees maintained that the amendment unconstitutionally
violated rights guaranteed by the first, fifth and ninth amendments and, since there was
no valid federal law, the union shop agreement they sought to enjoin was in violation
of the "right to work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution. 3 The Supreme Court of
Nebraska agreed and held the Union Shop Amendment unconstitutional. 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, upheld the constitutionality of the Union Shop Amend-
ment as an appropriate exercise of power granted by the commerce clause, and affirmed
the validity of union shop contracts made pursuant to it. 5 Although the Court found
the amendment to be a proper means of attaining the avowed purpose of its enactment,
the elimination of "free riders," 6 it reversed its approval of such means noting it is
solely a legislative, policy decision.7
In its holding, the Supreme Court confined itself to the application of the Union
Shop Amendment to the facts in Hanson:
For we pass narrowly on § 2, Eleventh [The Union Shop Amendment] of the Rail-
way Labor Act. We only hold that the requirement for financial support of the collec-
tive bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or
Fifth Amendment.8
The Hanson decision, then, raises two pertinent questions: What union activities
are germane to collective bargaining so as to justify compulsory support from those
othewise opposed to union membership; and what relief is available to unwilling union
members when it is determined that dues, fees and assessments are being used for pur-
poses not necessary or reasonably related to collective bargaining? The issue presented
in the instant case attempts to illumine both of these questions. Are political expenditures
made from union dues, fees and assessments sufficiently related to the cost of collective
bargaining that members, who protest such a use of the funds, may not enjoin their
collection?
Reference to this problem was made shortly after Hanson in Sandsberry v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists.9 Refusing to enjoin the enforcement of a union shop
contract, the Supreme Court of Texas expressed the opinion that political assessments
were not contemplated by Congress when they used the word "assessment" in the Union
Shop Amendment, and that workers could not be discharged for failure to pay such
assessments.' 0
More closely on point was the recent case of Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry.11
where the Georgia Supreme Court reversed an order to dismiss an action brought by
1 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1951), amending 44 Stat. 577 (1925).
2 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
3 NEB. CoNsT. art 15, § 13; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1943).
4 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
5 Railway Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
6 See 96 CONG. Rrac. 16279 (1950) (congressional debate on the Railway Labor Amendment,
remarks of Senator Hill).
7 Railway Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 234 (1956).
8 Id. at 238. The Court expressly stated no opinion on other problems which might arise in
connection with a union shop contract under the amendment. The Court pointed out, "If 'assess-
ments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germaine to collective bargaining, a different problem
would be present . . ." and in conclusion noted, "If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the
exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity
or other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the
decision in that case." Id. at 235, 238.
9 295 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
10 Id. at 416.
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employees under circumstances similar to the instant case. The court held that allegations
by the employees that their dues were to be used to advance ideological and political
doctrines in which they did not believe, and to support political candidates whom
they did not favor, stated a valid claim against the union. The case was subsequently tried
in the Superior Court, Bibb County, Georgia.12 Here, the court found that substantial
parts of the dues and fees contributed by members were used for publications advocating
political ideas, political candidates and economic concepts, none of which had the
approval of the plaintiffs. The court further found such expenditures were not germane
to collective bargaining.
In the instant case, the jury found that dues and fees had also been used for
political purposes not germane to collective bargaining.' 5 Yet the North Carolina court
reversed, holding that such political activities as the record indicated were related to
collective bargaining within the meaning of the criterion enunciated in Hanson - "for
financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of
its work.' 14
The court said:
We do not think this language conveys the idea that the financial support required
is limited to such expenditures as the collective bargaining agency incurs while
engaged in the negotiation and servicing of collective bargaining agreements. Rather,
it indicates that the required financial support embraces all activities of the collective
bargaining agency reasonably related to its maintenance as an effective bargaining
representative. If our interpretation is correct it would seem that, in the discharge of
its obligations, the collective bargaining agency would be expected to keep in touch
with and make known its findings in respect of legislation tending to promote or
impair its collective bargaining position or tending to enhance or defeat the interests
of those whom it represents. In doing so, they would do neither more nor less than
the representatives of carriers with whom they negotiate collective bargaining agree-
ments.15
Stated simply, the question raised in Looper and the instant case was whether
Congress, in enacting the Union Shop Amendment, and the Supreme Court in inter-
preting it, intended the expense of political activities to be regarded as necessarily or
reasonably related to collective bargaining. Neither Congress nor the court directly
answered this question. During congressional debate on the Union Shop Amendment
reference was made to union political activities but the problem was not solved.1 6 So
too, in the Hanson case, the Court alluded to this matter but failed to pass on it as the
problem was not presented by the record.lv
However, Congress and the courts have not always been silent on the relationship
between unions and political affairs. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1947' s was designed
to limit the political expenditures of, among others, labor organizations. The act made
it unlawful to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with federal elections.
The leading case arising under this law was United States v. CIO19 where the political
expenditures alleged were similar to those in the instant case. The Court, in holding that
the activities of the union did not violate the law, said that a union could maintain a
newspaper with money drawn from the general fund, and that advocating legislation
affecting the interests of the union and supporting candidates favorable to their interest
were "normal organizational activities."'20 Later cases, relying on the CIO decision,
11 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957).
12 Looper v. Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry., 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 65,133.
13 Allen v. Southern Ry., 107 S.E.2d 125, 135 (N.C. 1959).
14 Railway Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,238 (1956); see text accompanying
note 8 supra.
15 Allen v. Southern Ry., 107 S.E.2d 125, 133 (N.C. 1959).
16 See 96 CONG. REc. 16277-16279 (remarks of Senators Holland and Hill); 96 CONG. REc.
17049, 17050 (remarks of Representative Hoffman).
17 Railway Employees Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956); see text accompanying
note 8 supra.
18 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
19 335 U.S. 106 (1947).
20 Id. at 123.
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reversed convictions in analogous situations, inferring that a labor union has vital and
proper interest in the political activities.2 '
Doubt has been expressed as to the validity of the Corrupt Practices Act or similar
state provisions on the grounds that unions have such an interest in political affairs that
they have a constitutional right to voice opinion in these matters.22 In a concurring
opinion in the CIO case, Mr. Justice Rutledge maintained:
The most complete exercise of those rights is essential to the full, fair and untrammeled
operation of the electoral process. To the extent they are curtailed the electorate
is deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function. To say that
labor unions as such have nothing of value to contribute to that process and no vital
or legitimate inteerst in it is to ignore the obvious facts of political and economic
life and of their increasing interrelationship in modem society.2 3
And Mr. Justice Rutledge further stated:
Moreover, this demonstrates, in my opinion, that "minority protection" was not the
only or perhaps the dominant object of its enactment. That object was rather to force
unions as such entirely out of political life and activity, including for presently pertinent
purposes the expression of organized viewpoint concerning matters affecting their vital
interests at the most crucial point where the expression would become effective. 24
While the case did not arise under the Corrupt Practices Act or a "right to work"
law, the decision in De Mille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists25 perhaps reflects a
tendency of judicial thought. De Mille, an unwilling member under a union shop con-
tract, was expelled from the union for failing to pay a special assessment to be used
to defeat proposed legislation. The Supreme Court of California upheld his expulsion.
The fact that he did not agree with purpose for which the money was to be used did not
lessen his obligation to pay. The union had a right to express its opinion as an association,
separate and distinct from the opinion which any individual member might have.
Although the foregoing cases do not strike at the heart of the problem, they do
indicate that the courts have realized that unions, as bargaining organizations, possess a
vital interest in political affairs. Now the courts are asked to draw the fine line between
union activities which are germane to collective bargaining and those which are not.
Congress has not been explicit and in the light of these decisions, the courts may find it
difficult to determine if political activities are germane to collective bargaining within
the meaning of the Hanson decision.
Regardless of the answer, however, the resolution of the problem seems properly
left in the hands of the court as a matter of law rather than a question of fact for the
jury. A jury could decide just what the expenditures were, the sources and recipients of
the money, and other clear questions of fact. But once these things are settled, the
determination of the relationship of the expenditures to collective bargaining is not a
question of fact but a matter of policy. Because of the uncertainty involved, a jury
verdict could only demonstrate that particular jury's attitude towards labor unions.
The remedy is, of course dependent upon the solution of the prior question. If the
Court determines that the cost of political expenditures must be shared by all union
members, the reluctant member has no remedy. If, however, these activities cannot
be financed from the contributions of unwilling union members some relief must be
granted. Respondents in the instant case sought to enjoin the union shop contract
entirely. That such relief would be too harsh may be seen from the fact that this, in
effect, would defeat the overall purpose of the union shop contract as approved in
Hanson. Perhaps the alternative proposed by respondents is the only feasible remedy.
The union would be compelled to establish what portion of its dues, fees and assessments
would be used for political purposes, and the charges upon the unwilling member would
then be reduced by a pro rata percentage.
John J. Coffey
21 United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. Con-
struction Laborers Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
22 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 593-598 (1957) (dissenting opinion); United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129-155 (1947) (concurring opinion).
23 United States v. CIO, supra note 22 at 144, 150.
24 Id. at 150.
25 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1947).
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LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS - PERJURY - CONVICTION MUST BE BASED ON
FALSE RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS IN PURSUIT OF VALID LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. - De-
fendant, president of a union, was called before the Senate Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Field, and asked questions which another wit-
ness alleged he had answered falsely in a prior appearance before the committee. He was
indicted for perjury after he reiterated his original testimony. On a motion for an
acquittal, held, a perjury indictment may not be based on false testimony given in
response to questions not asked to elicit facts in aid of a valid legislative purpose.
United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959).
Two of the requirements for a conviction of perjury are that the questions must
be asked before a competent tribunal and that they must relate to material matter.
These two requirements are closely connected to the rule that a congressional com-
mittee must be validly constituted and pursuing a legitimate legislative objective. In
United States v. Icardi2 the court found that an investigating committee was not acting
as a competent tribunal if it was not pursuing a bona fide legislative purpose in secur-
ing the testimony of a witness, even if the testimony was pertinent to a matter which
could be the subject of a valid legislative investigation. 3 In order for testimony to be
pertinent, 4 the material sought, or answers requested, must relate to a valid legislative
purpose, and such materials or answers must fall within the grant of authority actually
made by Congress to the committee. 5 In Barenblatt v. United States6 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court gave five methods by which the pertinence of a question can
be made clear to the witness: 1) the authorizing resolution, 2) opening remarks of the
chairman, members, or counsel of the committee, 3) the nature of the proceedings, 4)
the questions themselves, and 5) the chairman's response to an objection on pertinency.
It has long been thought that Congress did not have the general power to make
inquiries into the private affairs of citizens, and that the absence of a valid legislative
purpose rendered void all acts of a committee. 7 But this general rule was weakened
somewhat in McGrain v. Daugherty.8 From this decision arose the rule that there was
a presumption that a bona fide legislative purpose existed toward which the inquiries of
the congressional committee were directed. In 1949 this presumption of the validity of
congressional activities was reaffirmed in Morford v. United States.9 The case involved
a conviction for contempt of Congress for refusing to turn over organizational records.
The court held that a valid legislative purpose "is presumed when the general subject of
investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and when the information
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948) which provides:
Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be adminis-
tered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which
he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.... (Emphasis added.)
2 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
3 Cf. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949). In this case a congressional committee
was held not to be a competent tribunal because the government failed to prove that a quorum of
the members of the committee was present at the time the alleged perjured testimony was given.
4 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929). Here the court stated that the question of
pertinency for contempt of Congress is not essentially different from the question of the materiality
of false testimony charged as being perjured.
5 United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 153 (3rd Cir. 1953). This case also states, "Because of
the scope and purpose of Congressional investigations, pertinency in this context is necessarily
broader than relevancy in the law of evidence." See also, Rumely v. Unitd States, 197 F.2d 166, 177
(D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) which defines pertinency as "pertinent to a subject matter
properly under inquiry, not generally pertinent to the person under interrogration."
6 252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958), afl'd 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4366 (U.S. June 8, 1959).
7 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 195 (1880).
8 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
9 175 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 258 (1950), affirmance
upheld on rehearing, 184 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 878 (1950).
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sought would materially aid its consideration."' 0 Further, the presumption cannot be
destroyed by impugning the motives of the individual members of the committee. 1
This presumption of validity still retained vigor as late as 1953. In that year United
States v. Orman12 employed the presumption in holding that it is the question and not
the answer which must be pertinent.
In perjury trials, as distinguished from proceedings for contempt of Congress, the
courts, however, have always been somewhat reluctant to recognize a presumption of
any of the material elements of the charge.' 3 The Icardi case' 4 is illustrative. Icardi
was called before a committee which had already obtained from him the information it
desired. The recall was effected with a view toward providing grounds for a possible
prosecution for perjury. The court held that the competency of the tribunal and the
materiality of this second questioning had to be shown by the government. And, since
the committee had acted with a view toward obtaining a possible perjury conviction,
there was no bona fide legislative purpose. Hence the questions asked could not have
been material nor the tribunal competent.' 5
Today the controlling case in the area of contempt and perjury before congressional
committees is Watkins v. United States.'8 Watkins was convicted for refusing to give
the names of people "whom he knew to be Communists. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed his conviction on the grounds that the questions were outside the scope of
the activities of the committee. The Court held that the inquiry must be related to, and
in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress, and that the pertinency of the questions
asked must be made evident to a witness who refuses to answer them. The ramifications
of this decision have almost completely destroyed any presumption of validity formerly
afforded actions of congressional committees. In one case,' 7 the defendant had answered
questions about communist meetings but refused to name those who had been present.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in affirming his conviction, held that there was no
possibility of self-incrimination. But the conviction was subsequently vacated' s by
the same court, without an opinion, on the basis of the principles set forth in Watkins.
Another example of the strict attitude the courts are taking today toward such com-
mittee action is Sacher v. United States.'9 There a conviction was reversed because it
was not undisputably clear that the questions asked were within the scope of the inquiry
of the committee. Another recent case,20 in its cumulative effect, has held congressional
committees to a rigid standard of notifying the witness of every aspect of the investiga-
tion which might be questionable or ambiguous.
In its recent decisions on contempt and perjury prosecutions, the Supreme Court
has strictly construed the limitations on the power of Congress to punish recalcitrant
witnesses. This judicial attitude is exemplified by the dissent in the Flaxer case:
But the force of Watkins cannot be confined to issues of pertinency. Watkins
requires as well clarity and certainty in the delegation of whatever power is sought
to be exercised to compel obedience by a witness on pain of punishment for crime
for not obeying. 21
10 Id. at 58.
'1 Ibid.
12 207 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1953). But see Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
in which the court held that pertinency had to be proved by the government unless, from the con-
text, it appeared that it was clearly pertinent.
13 See Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 622 (1939).
14 United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
15 Cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), in which the Court gave another indication
of what was to come by holding that if it appeared that a witness had claimed a constitutional
privilege, it then became the duty of the committee to find out for certain whether the person was
invoking the privilege. If he was standing on a constitutional privilege, the committee had to order
him to answer; and if it failed to do so then there could be no conviction for contempt.
10 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
17 Singer v. United States, 244 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1S 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
19 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
20 Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
21 Flaxer v. United States, 258 F.2d 413, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd, 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
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The court has thus required that the witness be specifically notified of the pertinency of
the questions; 22 that the questions be undisputably within the scope of the authorization; 23
that there be no possibility of any tendency to incriminate;2 4 that the time of delivery
under a subpoena duces tecum be certain;25 and now, in perjury cases, that the questions
asked be for a legitimate legislative purpose, even if they are relevant to an authorized
and valid inquiry.2
6
The instant decision is well in line with the trend of recent cases. The presumption
in favor of a valid legislative purpose was not accorded the committee. The judge
reasoned that by the very fact that Cross was recalled with a view toward a possible
perjury prosecution, the purpose of the committee was, therefore, invalid. Hence,
today it appears that from the congressional resolution authorizing the creation of the
committee, down through the explanation given a recalcitrant witness, the questions
asked by the committee must be pertinent to the inquiry, and the government must
show beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been full compliance with the statutory
requirements for a conviction.
But whether the courts have chosen a wise course to follow in this area is another
question. As Mr. Justice Clark suggests in his dissent in Watkins, the decision of the
majority seems to show an unawareness of the practical problems facing a congressional
committee. The courts by refusing to punish those accused of contempt and perjury
exercise extensive control over congressional hearings. The threat of possible punishment
is the most effective means available to enable Congress to obtain necessary information.
The attitude of strictness manifested by the courts in this area seems unrealistic. It
demands of the legislature an impracticable amount of certitude in its investigatory
activities. As such it impedes rather than aids our democratic processes.
Paul J. Schierl
PRISONERS - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - PRISONER CANNOT MAINTAIN SUIT
FOR INJURIES SUFFERED WHILE CONFINED IN FEDERAL HOSPITAL. - Plaintiff was
convicted and sentenced to prison for the possession of narcotics, but upon the re-
commendation of the sentencing judge, he was committed to the United States Public
Health Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, for treatment for narcotics addiction. While
confined in the hospital, he suffered serious injuries allegedly as a result of the
negligence of the government's agents or employees, for which he brought suit. On the
government's motion for an order dismissing the complaint, held, motion granted. A
prisoner cannot maintain a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries suffered
while confined in a federal hospital.1 Berman v. United States, 170 F.Supp. 107 (E.D.
N.Y. 1959).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, apparently based on the medieval notion that
"the king can do no wrong," was early applied to bar suits against the federal govern-
ment.2 Redress for wrongs suffered at the hands of the government was thought to be
a matter of privilege, not of right, and it could only be obtained by means of a private
22 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
23 Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
24 Singer v. United States, 244 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
25 Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
26 United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
2 "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States .... Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821); PRossER, TORTS, 770
(2nd ed. 1955).
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bill in Congress. But this cumbersome and inadequate method slowly gave way during
the last century as Congress consented to suits within a gradually expanded sphere of
liability.3 Perhaps the most significant step in this progressive waiver of immunity was
the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. As applicable to the instant case,
the act provides, in substance, that the United States is liable for the negligence of its
employees or agents under circumstances where, if it were a private person, it would
be liable according to the law of the place where the negligence occurred.4
A number of the courts considering the question have felt that the act should be
construed consonant with its benevolent purpose.5 But in practice the courts have not
always been generous in permitting recovery.6 In Feres v. United States,7 which in-
volved three separate claims by members of the armed services for injuries received
incident to service, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the liability of the
United States in a situation not entirely dissimilar to the instant case. The court denied
recovery on the following grounds. First, a comprehensive system of compensation had
already been provided for the armed services.8 Second, since a private person does not
possess the right to maintain an army, there is no analogous liability of a "private in-
dividual under like circumstances." 9 Finally, the provision to make the law of the place
applicable is inconsistent with the distinctively federal character of the relationship
between the government and its soldier.10
To date the reasoning of Feres, applied by analogy, has been determinative of suits
brought by federal prisoners against the government. In Sigmon v. United States,',
where the analogy was first used to deny recovery, the court significantly remarked
that a contrary result might be extremely detrimental to the maintenance of discipline.
Noting that some compensation had been provided for prisoners, 12 the court assumed
that Congress meant only to provide that measure of relief. Further, it found no
analogous private liability since no private individual has the right to reduce and keep
another in penal servitude.' 3 That the act makes liability depend upon the law of the
place was viewed as indicative that Congress did not anticipate actions by prisoners,
for such would disrupt the uniform penal system by submitting a previously exclusive
federal relationship to the varieties of state law. The rationale of Sigmon was accepted
without serious question in Shew v. United States14 and in Van Zuck v. United States.15
3 See WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr 1-5 (1957); Yankwich, Problems under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143, 148 (1949).
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1952).
5 See, e.g., Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 624 (2nd Cir. 1954); O'Toole v. United
States, 206 F.2d 912, 918 (3rd Cir. 1953).
6 See Note, Federal Government Liability "as a Private Person" under the Tort Claims Act,
88 IND. L. J. 339 (1958).
7 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
8 But see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) where payment under this compensation
system was said to be no bar to action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages for injury
not incident to army service.
9 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
10 United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947).
11 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953). Prisoner was ordered to sharpen an axe on a emery wheel
which had been allowed to fall into a dangerous state of disrepair.
12 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1950) provides: "The [Federal Prison Industries] corporation . . . is
authorized to employ the [Prison Industries] fund in paying, under rules and regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General, ... compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in
any industry."
13 But see N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 wherein the state assumes liability "in accordance with the
same rules of law applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals and corporations." In
McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.2d 591 (1950), rehearing denied, 302 N.Y. 950,
98 N.E.2d 117 (1951) a prisoner was granted recovery for personal injuries resulting from negligent
medical treatment in prison. Apparently the New York court disregarded the relation between state
and prisoner, and it decided on malpractice grounds, as well as the neglect of a duty imposed by
law to protect the health of prisoners.
14 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. N.C. 1953). Prisoner in dismounting from truck caught his foot on
baling wire and was thrown violently to the ground, breaking his leg and suffering other injuries.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Jones v. United States,1 6 the only consideration of the question on the appellate
level, the reasoning of Feres was again used to deny recovery, with emphasis upon the
legal incapacity of a private individual to hold another in penal servitude. The re-
quirement of application of the law of the place was again seen as destructive of the
uniformity of the federal penal system, as it was suggested in Sigmon.
In reaching a like decision adverse to the claimant, the court in the instant case
relied heavily on the reasoning of Feres in rejecting liability determined by the law of the
place where a distinctively federal relationship was involved. The court also denied the
plaintiff's further contention that his status at the hospital was that of a patient and
not of a prisoner. It noted that although the plaintiff was being treated as a patient,
there was a distinction made by statute between voluntary patients and prisoners in the
administration of the hospital.'
7
As representing another case in a developing line of decisions denying recovery to
federal prisoners, the instant case is subject to adverse criticism. Moreover, the decision
is particularly objectionable since the prisoner was not employed in any prison industry' 8
and, therefore, is without hope of compensation, 19 a fact which was apparently over-
looked by the court in stating that "a prisoner is not without provision for compensation
for injuries which he may sustain while an inmate."'2 0 Some explanation for the court's
unwillingness to allow recovery might be found in a natural hesitancy to subject the
relationship between the federal government and its prisoners to the varied and shifting
tort principles of the several states21 without the express authorization of Congress.
This position is maintained although the listed exceptions 22 and an application of the
expressio unius rule would seem to dictate a contrary result.23
It is submitted that the term "distinctively federal relationship" is capable of two
references, one geographical and the other governmental. In the instant case, the court
concentrated upon the geographical and concluded that Congress could not have intended
that the tort liability of the government to its prisoners should be subjected to the
variety of treatments afforded by the individual states. Subconsciously perhaps, the gov-
The court, in addition to denying the right of a prisoner to bring such an action, found no negligence
as a matter of fact.
15 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). Prisoner alleged negligence of a prison doctor in treating
for a piece of steel wool embedded in prisoner's thumb. This decision is particularly noteworthy since
the court rejected the argument that there is a private liability for malpractice analogous to the
alleged negligence in the operation in the prison hospital, saying that all circumstancs must be
considered, including the relation between government and prisoner.
16 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957). Prisoner alleged negligence of government employees in re-
quiring him to do heavy work while suffering from a severe illness, and in failing to give adequate
medical care.
17 See 58 Stat. 699, 701 (1944), 42 U.S.C. §§ 259(d), 260(a) (1952).
18 "[W]e feel sure that neither Judge Rayfiel [who decided the instant case] nor the United
States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York were aware that Mr. Berman was
not employed in Prison Industries when they advised you." Letter from James V. Bennett, Director,
Bureau of Prisons, to Liebowitz, Cobert & Deixel, New York 4, New York, counsel for plaintiff,
March 5, 1959.
19 18 U.S.C. § 4126 grants recovery to those prisoners who suffer injury in any industry; and 40
C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.10 sets forth regulations concerning amount and payment of compensation.
20 170 F. Supp. at 109.
21 "Civil death" exists in varying degrees in approximately one-third of the jurisdictions of this
country and sometimes operates to bar suits by prisoners. Notes, The Legal Status of Convicts during
and after Incarceration, 37 VA. L. Rav. 105 (1951) and Civil Death Statutes - Medieval Fiction
in a Modern World, 50 HAIv. L. REv. 968 (1937). For possible effect under Federal Tort Claims
Act, compare McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F.Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955) where a California statute
which barred actions by prisoners during their term of confinement was held not to bar a civil
action under a federal statute protecting civil rights 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952), in
spite of FEn. R. Civ. P. 17(b) which provides that "the capacity of an individual .. .to sue or be
sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile (or) by the law of the state in which the district
court is held."
22 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1949).
23 Wvasro, THE FEDRAL ToRT CLAiMs Act 30 (1957).
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ernmental reference is more persuasive if we consider that a court might naturally recoil
from the notion of a prisoner successfully asserting a claim against the sovereign which
holds him in penal servitude. But this feeling should bear no weight when the govern-
ment has indicated that its status under the act shall be that of a private individual.
This would be particularly true where prisoners in state institutions have successfully
maintained similar actions. 24 Furthermore, the well-established distinction concerning
municipal corporations which finds immunity in "governmental" functions and liability
in "proprietary" activities25 seemingly has been denied applicability under the act,26
evidencing a hesitancy to introduce into federal law the unwieldly morass of con-
flicting views within various jurisdictions as to what distinguishes governmental from
proprietary activity.2 7
The line of cases barring recovery to prisoners seems to constitute an unwarranted
exception within the area of general liability created by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The rejection of the governmental-proprietary distinction and the recognition on the
state level of a state prisoner's right of recovery would seem to establish a right of
federal prisoners to recover, at least where the law of the place includes such a waiver
of immunity. The blanket exception of prisoners from rights under the act reflects a
survival of an attitude rejected in Sigmon, quoted from Ruffin v. Commonwealth,28 that
a convicted felon has "not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except
those which the law in its humanity accords to him." Such an attitude is clearly
untenable.
Gerald M. Gallivan
STATE TAXING POWER - AN ACCOMODATIoN OF STATE AND FEDERAL POWERS
STATE PROPERTY TAXES AND THE IMPORT-ExPORT CLAUSE, AND STATE NET INCOME
TAXEs AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. - In several cases decided on February 24, 1959
the Supreme Court of the United States sustained certain state taxes which had been
challenged upon the ground that they were contrary to the import-export and com-
merce clauses of the Constitution of the United States.1 There were vigorous dissents
from these decisions.
These cases, involving underlying questions as to the accomodation of federal and
state powers under our federal scheme of government, are profoundly significant. One
commentator has characterized the decisions as "a gain for states' rights" and has re-
marked that the champions of states' rights have found an "unexpected ally" in the
Supreme Court. 2 In the light of the barrages of criticism that have been levelled at
the Supreme Court in recent years for its alleged disregard for states' rights, such
statements may be surprising at first glance. However, the cases which have been
pointed to as evidencing a disregard of state powers have been cases involving civil
or personal rights whereas the present cases involve state economic measures. As Pro-
24 Research fails to indicate whether the plaintiff in the instant case would be able to recover
'under Kentucky law if he had been a state prisoner. But prisoners do have a right to sue in
Kentucky. State Board of Charities and Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S.E. 282 (1929). Claims
against the Commonwealth are usually settled by a Board of Claims on grounds that "would entitle
claimant to a judgment in an action at law if the State were amenable to such action." Ky. REv.
STAT. § 44. 120 (1955).
25 PROSSER, TORTS 774-80 (2nd ed. 1955).
26 Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
27 Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
28 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 1024 (1871).
1 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959) (import-export clause), and
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (commerce clause).
2 Lewis, A Gain for States' Rights, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1959, p. 56, col. 3.
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fessor Paul A. Freund, a noted authority on Constitutional Law, has indicated, the
present Supreme Court pays great deference to state economic measures, sustaining
many which might have run afoul of the judicial veto a generation ago.3
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the instant cases in the light of
prior judicial pronouncements to determine whether or not they represent a departure
from precedent and, if so, whether it is a justifiable departure. Finally, an attempt will
be made to point out possible future repercussions of these cases. In order to facilitate
this purpose separate treatment will be given each case.
A. THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE
The Constitution of the United States provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Impost or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection laws .... 4
In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers5 appellant had imported various ores
in bulk for use in its Ohio manufacturing plant. As these ores were delivered they were
placed in piles separated according to the grade and source of the ore. From time to
time ore was taken from these piles for use in the manufacturing process. The piles
were continually being replenished by new shipments of ore. The ores in these piles
were assessed for the state property tax.6 The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the assess-
ment against the challenge that it was an unconstitutional tax on imports.7 The state
court declared that the import-export clause did not extend to the ore (1) after it had
been commingled with other ore imported at different times, even though of the same
grade and imported from the same place, and (2) after portions of such ore had been
removed for use in the manufacturing process.
In United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algomas petitioner had imported cer-
tain veneers for use in its manufacturing plant. These veneers were stored in the peti-
tioner's warehouse in the wooden crates in which they had arrived, or in bundles
secured by metal straps in which form they had been shipped. The city assessed for
taxation one-half of the total value of the imported veneers. 9 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin sustained the tax on the ground that the veneers had lost their character as
imports because they were stored to meet the petitioner's current operational needs. 10
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Whittaker expressing the views of six members of the
Court, both decisions were held, affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with the concurrence
of Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented.
Approximately 132 years ago in Brown v. Maryland," the leading decision under
the import-export clause, Chief Justice Marshall formulated the now familiar "original
package" doctrine. After pointing out that a "duty on imports" was not merely a duty
on the act of importation and while recognizing that there must be a time when an
article ceases to be an import -and becomes incorporated and mixed up with the mass
3 Professor Freund's Lecture at Brandeis University on Nov. 12, 1958. See N.Y. Times, March
1, 1959, p. 56, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1958, p. 22, col. 6. In support of Professor Freund's theory
see the recent cases upholding state taxes on federal property held or leased by private parties. United
States and Borg-Warner Corp. v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States and Continental
Motors Corp. v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of
America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958); American Motors Corp. and The United States v. City of Kenosha,
80 N.W. 2d 363, aff'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 21 (1958).
4 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cI. 2.
5 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
6 Title 57, OlHo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.01 and 5701.08 (A) (1953).
7 166 Ohio St. 122, 140 N.E.2d 313 (1957).
8 358 U.S. 534 (1959). In addition to the tax on the veneers, a tax was also assessed upon
lumber imported from Canada which had been left in petitioner's yard where air-drying took place.
The majority did not reach the question whether this lumber had entered the manufacturing process.
The dissent held that it had entered the manufacturing process and, therefore, was subject to the tax.
9 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 70.01 (1957).
10 2 Wis.2d 567, 87 N.W.2d 481 (1958).
11 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266 (1827). The case involved a license fee which Marshall equated to
a tax. Although it was discriminatory, the Court did not invalidate it upon that ground.
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of property within the state, subject to taxation, he held that such was not the situation
in the case before him since the goods in question remained in the original package in
which imported. He declared:
[W]hile remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original
form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on
imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution. 12
The Supreme Court'has steadily adhered to the doctrine thus formulated.13 This case,
together with subsequent cases, points out the various ways in which an imported
article may cease to be an "import" entitled to the protection of the Constitution. They
are:
(1) breaking the original package, 14
(2) Changing the character of the goods imported by subjecting them to a manu-
facturing process,' 5
(3) selling the goods, 16 or
(4) making use of the goods. 17
In Hooven and Allison Co. v. EvattI s the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
declared that in the application of the "original package" doctrine no distinction could
be made between goods imported for sale and goods imported for manufacturing
purposes. The Court then proceeded to reject the notion that imported goods, which
were merely being held awaiting use, were subject to state taxation.
There are no Supreme Court decisions which give credence to the notion that un-
packaged imports are not entitled to the same constitutional protection as is accorded
goods imported in packages. In formulating the "original package" doctrine, Marshall
explicitly referred to "original form or package" of the goods when imported.19 This
language has received expression in various state and territorial court decisions.
20
In the instant decision the Supreme Court seemingly used the "current operational
needs" theory of the Wisconsin Court to sustain both the Ohio and the Wisconsin tax
levies.21 In so sustaining these state taxes, the Court seized upon the following language
of Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Hooven and Allison:
[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether, for the purposes of the constitutional
immunity, the presence of some fibers in the factory was so essential to current
manufacturing requirements that they could be said to have entered the process of
manufacture, and hence were already put to the use for which they were imported,
before they were removed from the original packages. Even though the inventory of
raw material required to be kept on hand to meet the current operational needs of
a manufacturing business could be thought to have entered the manufacturing process,
the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest on that ground, and the record
12 Id. at 280.
13 See Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S.
566 (1878); Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 590
(1847).
14 May and Co. v. City of New Orleans, 178 U.S. 1165 (1900).
15 Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928) (imported raw fish processed prior
to the imposition of the tax). But see Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871) (imported
champagne not subject to taxation while in the possession of the importer although during such
time it was aging).
16 Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110 (1869) (the initial importer had entered into
a contract of sale prior to the landing of the goods, but, since under the contract he was responsible
for any loss or damage, his vendee was held not to take his place as importer).
17 Southern Pacific Co. v. Calexico, 288 Fed. 634 (S.D. Cal. 1923) (imported goods pledged to
secure a loan held to be taxable because put to use). See also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 266, 281 (1827) (dictum) (referring to plate or furniture used by the importer).
IS 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
19 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266, 280 (1827).
20 In re Taxes Pacific Guana and Fertilizer Co., 32 Hawaii 431 (1932) (phosphate rock imported
in bulk); Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'r, 173 La. 604, 138 So. 117 (1931)
(crude oil pumped from ships into storage tanks containing oil previously imported); City of Galveston
v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15 F.2d 208 (S.D. Tex. 1926); Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. The
Borough of Roosevelt, Sup. Ct. NJ., Oct. 14, 1919. But see Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. City of
South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Ad. 900 (1912) (imported crude oil became subject to state taxing
power the instant it was pumped into onshore storage tanks).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
affords no basis for saying that any part of petitioner's fibers, stored in its warehouse,
were required to meet such immediate current needs. Hence we have no occasion to
consider that question.2 2
The petitioner made a very plausible argument that Mr. Chief Justice Stone had used
the term "current operational needs" in a much more restricted sense than it was being
used in the instant case.2 3 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this more restrictive
interpretation of the phrase, which would have limited it to more immediate needs of
the manufacturing process, in favor of a broader interpretation which enabled the Court
to sustain the taxes in question while paying lip-service to Hooven and Allison.
However, assuming that Hooven and Allison had left open the question of the
instant case, the rationale of that case would appear to preclude this hitherto unrecog-
nized limitation upon the "original package" doctrine. Hooven and Allison recognized
that there is a
... constitutional necessity that the immunity, if it is to be preserved at all, survive
the landing of the merchandise in the United States and continue until a point is
reached, capable of practical determination, when it can fairly be said that it has
become a part of- the mass of taxable property within the state .... 24 (Emphasis
added.)
The "original package" doctrine admirably served this requirement as is indicated by
the relatively few reported cases on the subject. The new "current operational needs"
test has been quite justifiably criticized as sacrificing the ease of administration made
possible by the "original package" doctrine.
2 5
B. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 2 6
The Constitution nowhere expressly limits the power of the states to tax interstate
commerce.
2 7 However, such a limitation has been read into the commerce clause28 by
the Supreme Court.
29
21 Although the Ohio tax had been sustained on other grounds below, the Supreme Court found
that, because the ore in question was essential to the operation of the plant and had been "irrevocably
committed" to use in the plant's manufacturing process, it had been so acted upon as to lose its
distinctive character as an import. 358 U.S. 534, 543. And again, the Court, apparently referring to
both the Ohio and Wisconsin cases, declared:
The materials here in question were imported to supply, and were essential to
supply, the manufacturer's current operating needs.... They were therefore subject
to taxation just like domestic property that was kept at the same place in the same
way for the same use. Id. at 392.
22 358 U.S. 534, citing Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 667 (1945).
23 Brief of Petitioner, United States Plywood Corp., pp. 24-29. See Brief Amici Curiae of Brom-
ley and Magill, pp. 19-31; and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 358 U.S. 534, 549-550.
24 324 U.S. 652, 667 (1945).
25 19 Ohio S.L.J. 777 (1958); 36 TEx. L. REv. 826 (1958); Brief of Petitioner, United States
Plywood Corp., pp. 19-22. It calls for a subjective determination, depending entirely upon the im-
porter's intent, and completely defies definition. Variations will be necessary from time to time and
from industry to industry. But see Brief of Respondent, City of Algoma, pp. 23-24. The test is
somewhat new and it would be strange if it did not present some difficulty. The record in the present
case indicates that it can be applied and, as time goes on, other criteria may be suggested.
26 Because of the complexity of the problems involved in this area of state taxation, the dis-
cussion herein will be limited mainly to the question of net income taxes which was the issue in the
cases to be commented upon. For extensive treatments of the entire area consult: POwELL, VAGAuERs
AND VARmTmS IN CoNsTIruTioNAL INTERPRETATIoN 180-215 (1956); and Hartman, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 233 (1953).
27 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have the power.., to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
28 Although there was some early dictum by Chief Justice Marshall to the effect that the
strictures of the import-export clause applied to goods coming from other states [Brown v. Mary-
land, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266, 285 (1827)], this view was subsequently repudiated by Mr. Justice
Miller in Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). Mr. Justice Miller's reasoning in doing
so has been termed dubious but practical. Note, 58 HAav. L. Rav. 858, 869 (1946).
29 Le Loup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888)(and cases cited therein). "[T]he reason
is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs
solely to Congress." See Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923) and American Steel and
Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1904), distinguishing between the absolute constitutional prohibition
against state taxation of imports and the implied prohibition of taxation which burdens interstate
commerce.
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In Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota30 a net income tax3 l was levied by Minnesota
against the appellant, an Iowa corporation, which maintained a small sales office in the
State of Minnesota. All orders received through Minnesota salesmen were subject to
approval by the home office in Iowa, and all shipments were direct from the home office
to the customers. Although appellant sold only to wholesalers, its salesmen would
attempt to find customers for those wholesalers who purchased from appellant. The
amount of income subject to taxation was determined according to the Minnesota
three-factor formula based upon (1) sales, (2) tangible property, and (3) payroll.3 2
All sales to Minnesota customers were charged to appellant as Minnesota sales. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota33 sustained the tax against commerce clause and due
process objections. It held that, although the Minnesota activities of the appellant were
exclusively in furtherance of interestate commerce, the tax was valid because it was
non-discriminatory and was fairly apportioned to the income earned from the Minnesota
activities.
In Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc.,34 respondent, a Delaware cor-
poration with its principle office and manufacturing plant in Alabama, maintained a
small sales office in Georgia. The only solicitation out of this office was exclusively in
furtherance of interestate commerce. Respondent paid the net income tax 35 levied upon
it, and in a suit to recover the taxes thus paid, the Georgia Supreme Court held the
tax to be invalid under the due process and commerce clauses of the Constitution. 36
The court declared that the tax was in the nature of a forbidden excise tax upon the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated the two cases for decision
and held, Minnesota decision affirmed; Georgia decision reversed. Treating the issue as
controlled by the rationale of former decisions, the majority declared:
[N]et income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be
subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly
apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to
support the same.3 7
The fact that the local activities were exclusively in furtherance of interestate commerce
was not deemed to be controlling. Justices Whittaker, Frankfurter and Stewart dis-
sented. Mr. Justice Whittaker declared the majority decision to be inconsistent with
prior cases, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, while acknowledging that the precise situation
had not previously been litigated, asserted that the taxes were invalid because they would
actively burden interestate commerce.
The competition between the need for unencumbered interstate commerce and the
conflicting need for local revenue has found expression in such varied statements by the
Supreme Court as: "[N]o state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in
any form,"38 and "Even interstate commerce must pay its way." 39 The Court, in the
more than 300 cases in which the problem has been presented, has by no means been
consistent. 40 In the instant case it recognized the inconsistency of its prior decisions
when it referred to "the tangled underbrush of past cases." 4 1
30 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
31 MINN. STAT. § 290.03 (1945).
32 Mnr. STAT. § 290.19 (1945).
33 250 Minn. 32, 84 N.W.2d 373 (1957).
34 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
35 GA. CODE ANN. § 92-311 (Supp. 1955).
36 213 Ga. 713, 101 S.E.2d 197 (1957).
37 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959).
ss Le Loup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (based upon the rationale that the
commerce clause creates an area of trade free from state control).
39 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919) (based upon the rationale
that the state has a right to payment for the protection accorded activities within the state).
40 See POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARITIEs iN CONsTrrTUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 180-215 (1956);
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233; Barrett, "Substance" v.
"Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740 (1953).
41 358 U.S. 450, 455 (1959). Counsel for Respondent was even more forthright when he admitted:
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
With the exception of a short interval, the predominant approach of the Court
has been a formalistic one, without consideration of the actual impact which th
particular tax has upon interstate commerce.4 2 Indeed, one might well say, as did the
late Professor Powell, "It must never be forgotten that from the economic standpoint the
states may tax interstate commerce and its fruits if they go about it in the right legal
ways." 43
To ascertain the constitutionality of such taxes the Court has developed certain
general principles. They are:
(1) Any tax which is directly imposed upon the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce will be held invalid."4
(2) Taxes imposed upon "local incidents" or "in-state events," which could not be
the basis of taxation elsewhere, are valid even though measured by what would be an
improper subject, if fairly apportioned to the activities within the taxing state. 45
(3) Taxes which discriminate against interstate commerce, either by favoring local
business 4 6 or by subjecting interestate commerce to the burdens of multiple taxation 47
are invalid. However, where the taxing statute is non-discriminatory upon its face, the
objecting taxpayer must demonstrate that there is, in fact, an unconstitutional burden
upon interstate commerce.48
An examination of the cases dealing with net income taxes discloses that there is
no case directly holding that the mere solicitation of orders is a sufficent local incident
to warrant the imposition of a state net income tax upon a foreign corporation when
such solicitation is exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce. Dicta in various
cases point both ways.49
"In this mass of decisions dicta can be found to support almost any conceivable position." Brief
for Respondent, Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc., p. 10.
42 Barrett, "Substance" v. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 740, 740-43 (1953).
43 POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 200-201 (1956). See
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951): "Even though the financial
burden on interstate commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may validly make
interstate commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the constitutional channel through which it
attempts to do so." (Emphasis added).
Since the Court in the instant case apparently would have struck down the taxes had they been
franchise taxes measured by net income, rather than net income taxes, it would appear to have ad-
hered to the formalistic approach.
44 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
45 Central Grayhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); International Harvester Co. v.
Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
For a discussion of the trouble which the Court has experienced in determining what is, and what
is not, a "local" activity consult Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 1953 WASH.
U.L.Q. 233, 251-52.
46 Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
47 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
48 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1932); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlin, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920).
49 Favoring such a tax are: West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 166 P.2d 861,
864-66 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946) (distinguishable because of the following local
activities: employees within the state authorized to receive payments, collect delinquent accounts, and
to make adjustments in case of complaints by customers; books were stored within the state);
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 656 (1942) (but sufficient local activities were
found in connection with the arrangements for intrastate distribution of the gas); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (but the operation of oil wells within the taxing jurisdiction was a sufficient
local activity); Peck and Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (merely held that federal income tax
collected from exporter was not a prohibited tax on exports).
Disfavoring such a tax are: Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951)
(remarking that the reference in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, supra as to the validity of
such a tax was "not essential" to the decision in that case-but distinguishable because the tax had
been defined by the state court as a franchise tax); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U.S. 203, 219 (1925) (but an excise tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce);
Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 148 (1918) (excise tax rather than tax on net
income).
RECENT DECISIONS
The majority, in order to sustain the Georgia and Minnesota levies in the instant
cases, relied upon dicta favoring such a tax. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, quite
correctly recognized that the issue had not been foreclosed by the cases cited by the
majority. He would have invalidated the taxes in question because of their potentiality
for actively burdening interstate commerce.
The possibility of such burdens are quite real. 50 Not only is there a possibility that
the domiciliary state of the foreign corporation might impose a similar tax upon the
same income, 51 but, in practice, the apportionment formulas used by the different states
vary widely, and they are, quite naturally, geared to securing the largest income for the
taxing state.5 2 The Court, moreover, has been very reluctant to overrule the apportion-
ment formulas which the states have devised for themselves. 53 Finally, the added costs
of compliance with the taxing statutes of all the states in which business is solicited,
should such states decide to so tax, would be substantial.5 4
Conclusion
The instant cases illustrate 'the awareness of the Supreme Court of the necessity for
the accomodation of the competing demands of the states and the nation in our federal
scheme of government. Indeed, this question of accomodation has been one of the
major issues facing the Supreme Court throughout our history as a nation, and the
litigation in the area of the commerce clause furnishes the prime example of the
mechanics of such accomodation within the framework of the judicial process. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has noted:
The history of the commerce clause . . . is the history of imposing artificial
patterns upon the play of economic life whereby an accomodation is achieved between
the interacting concerns of states and nation. The problems of the commerce clause
are problems in this process of accomodation, however different the emphasis of pre-
ference of interest, and however diverse the legal devices by which different judges
may make these accomodations. Because such are the problems and such the relevant
considerations for their adjustment, the constitutional labors of the Supreme Court,
especially with the commerce clause, are accurately described as statecraft. But it is
an exercise in statesmanship hemmed in by the restrictions attending the adjudicatory
process. Far-reaching political principles arise through the accidents of unrelated and
intermittent cases, presenting issues confined by the exigencies of the legal record,
depending for elucidation upon the learning and insight of counsel fortuitiously
selected for the particular case, and imprisoning the judgment, at least in part, within
legal habituations and past utterances.S5
50 See Brief for Respondent, Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc., pp. 24-38; Brief for Appellant,
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., pp. 28-33; Studenski and Glasser, Neiv Threat in State
Business Taxation, 36 HARv. Bus. Rav. 77 (Nov. 1958).
51 See United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918) (state of domicile allowed to
tax the entire net income although it included income from sales outside the state). But compare
the following line of cases dealing with personal property taxes. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 295 (1944), the argument had been made that the taxation of petitioner's
entire fleet of planes by the domiciliary state would result in a multiple tax burden since other states
levied tax on part of the value of the fleet. The Court rejected the argument as not before it, but
added that payments to other states could not abridge the home state's power to tax. However, the
Court has subsequently declared that personal property, which is used in interstate commerce and
may be taxed by two or more states on an apportionment basis, may not be taxed by the domiciliary
state on other than an apportionment basis. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board, 347 U.S. 590, 601-
602 (1954); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952).
52 Studenski and Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, 36 HARv. Bus. REv. 77, 89
(Nov. 1958); ALTMAN AND KEESLiNG, ALLOCATION OF INCOME n STATE TAxATION 14 (1950).
53 See International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947); Butler Brothers v. McColgan,
315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942) ("One who attacks a formula of apportionment carries a distinct burden
of showing by 'clear and cogent evidence' that it results in extra-territorial values being taxed.");
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 365 (1940) ("[B]y its very nature the problem
is incapable of precise and arithmetical solution," and a local formula should not be overturned unless
it can be shown "to project the taxing power of the state plainly beyond its borders."). The reason
for this reluctance is that there is no conclusive way to determine the weight which should be given
to any particular element.
54 Studenski and Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, 36 HARv. Bus. REv. 77, 88-90
(Nov. 1958).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In holding that imported goods held for the "current operational needs" of a
manufacturing concern may be subjected to a non-discriminatory state property tax,
the Supreme Court appears to have departed from the rationale of prior cases. But, in
doing so, it has not ignored the purpose underlying the import-export clause. 56
Certain future developments in this area may be expected,
(1) Litigation, calling for a clarification of what the phrase "current operational
needs" actually embraces, appears almost certain.
(2) An attempt to apply the new test to goods held for sale is quite likely. 57
(3) There is a strong possibility that Hooven and Allison will be either expressly
overruled or relegated to the Limbo of forgotten cases by the silent acquiescence of the
Court.
(4) The recognition of this limitation of the "original package" doctrine may
foreshadow its judicial eclipse.
In holding that state net income taxes, based upon local activities of a foreign
corporation which are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce, are valid, the
Supreme Court has seemingly determined that a mere potential danger of multiple
burdens upon interstate commerce, arising therefrom, is not sufficient to require that the
states be denied this source of income. However, if the potentiality is as great as the
objecting taxpayers in these cases would have us believe, we may well expect increased
agitation for congressional action to remedy the situation.58 Should Congress fail to act
and the potentiality of harm become an actuality, it is quite likely that the Court, in
future cases, not only will preclude the state of domicile from taxing net income on
other than an apportionment basis, but also will begin to exercise greater control over
the apportionment formulas which the individual states have devised for their own use.
The only other alternative would seem to be a retreat from the position taken in the
instant decision, and this does not appear likely in view of the present predilections of
the Supreme Court.
Lawrence James Bradley
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - HORSEPLAY - COMPENSATION DENIED WIDOW
OF EMPLOYEE KILLED By MAN HE WAS "KIDDING." - The decedent and another in
the course of their employment were taunting a third party in regard to the speed of his
work. The third party became angry and hit decedent in the head with a shovel causing
his death. The State Compensation Commissioner held the claim compensable, and the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. On appeal to the West Virginia
Supreme Court, held, reversed. The injury received was due to a purely personal matter
between employees, not arising out of the employment, and is therefore not compensable.
Claytor v. State Compensation Comm'r, 106 S.E.2d 920 (W.Va. 1959).
55 FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 21-22 (1937).
56 See MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVEtroN 479 (Aug. 28, 1787) (Hunt and Scott
ed.); 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTioN 441-42 (1937). See also 27 FORDHAm
L. REv. 278 (1958); Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 490, 491-92 (1947); Note, 58 HARv. L. REv. 858, 875 n.
62 (1945).
57 Reliance might be placed upon the statement in Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S.
652, 667 (1945), that no distinction between goods imported for sale and goods imported for manu-
facturing purposes is permissible. And, as the late Professor Powell has noted, goods imported for
manufacturing purposes logically would appear to have a stronger claim to immunity than goods
imported for sale because they are a step farther away from intermingling and, in any event, would
be subject to a tax upon their sale in finished form. Note, 58 HARv. L. REv. 858, 871 (1945).
58 See Studenski and Glasser, New Threat in State Business Taxation, 36 HARV. BUS. REv. 77,
90-91 (Nov. 1958); Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233, 255-69.
RECENT DECISIONS
Early American decisions,1 following the English lead,2 uniformly denied com-
pensation to victims of horseplay. The first significant breakthrough came in 1920 in
the celebrated case of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills3 in which compensation was
given to a non-participating victim. Justice Cardozo reasoned that "the claimant was
injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but because he was in a factory in touch
with associations and conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks of such
associations and conditions were risks of the employment. ' 4 That this broad language
was to be limited to compensation for non-participating victims was made clear in
Frost v. Franklin Mfg. Co.,5 and this result has been widely accepted both by case law
and statute.6
Other exceptions were introduced by the courts to mitigate the harsh effects of a
strict application of the horseplay doctrine. Involuntary participation by an employee
was held compensable because "his struggle to free himself was as involuntary as that
of closing the eye to avoid dust.' 7 Other jurisdictions held that if the employer had
actual knowledge of the occurrence of horseplay and permitted such to continue then
compensation would be granted even though the victim may have been a voluntary
participant at some stage of the horseplay.8 What might be characterized as the New
York rule has evolved in recent years, and manifests at least one court's reluctance to
apply the usual rule. Even the participant or instigator may recover if the horseplay
was a regular incident of the employment as distinguished from an isolated act.9
Today most courts pay homage to the horseplay doctrine, but the exceptions are
becoming more numerous than the instances of adherence to the rule. The instigator,
however, remains generally uncompensated because of the still extant common law
theory that one should not profit by his own wrong.' 0 This would seem to be the
underlying principle in the instant case.
The court in this case, in common with many other courts," assumed that the
victim was "in the course of" his employment but said that the accident did not "arise
out of" the employment. In thus concluding, the court had to struggle with the problem
of whether the horseplay and resultant injury was a risk of the employment. Under
the New York rule, if the horseplay is customary, then it becomes a condition under
which the employee is required to work and hence injury resulting therefrom is com-
pensable as a "risk" arising out of the employment; but an isolated incident not being
foreseeeable is not such a risk.'
2
This would appear to be an extremely liberal interpretation of risk in light of the
decision in the instant case. Nevertheless, it still does not break the shackles of the
horseplay doctrine, and has been subjected to much criticism.13
I In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913); Hulley v. Moosebrugger, 88 N.J.L. 161,
95 Atl. 1007 (1915).
2 Fitzgerald v. W. G. Clarke & Son, [1908] 2 K.B. 796; Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorshire Ry.,
[1902] 2 K.B. 178.
8 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
4 Id. at 711.
5 236 N.Y. 649, 142 N.E. 319 (1923).
6 See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal.2d 286, 158 P.2d 9
(1945); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.152, § 26 (1957).
7 Tabor v. Midland Flour Milling Co., 237 Mo. App. 392, 168 S.W.2d 458, 460 (1943); accord,
Hamilton Co. v. Bickel, 174 Okla. 32, 49 P.2d 1065 (1935).
8 In re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N.E. 324 (1917); White v. Kansas City Stockyards, 104
Kan. 90, 177 Pac. 522 (1919); Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N.W. 617 (1924).
9 Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N.Y. 85, 80 N.E.2d 749 (1948); Industrial Comm'r v.
McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E.2d 434 (1946).
10 See Horowitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REV.
311, 323 (1946); But see Brown v. Vacuum Oil Co., 171 La. 707, 132 So. 117 (1930).
11 See, e.g., Savage v. Otis Elevator Co., 136 N.J.L. 419, 56 A.2d 595 (1948).
12 Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E. 2d 434 (1946).
13 See Horowitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. RaV.
311 (1946); 33 CALm. L. RaV. 458 (1945); but see, Note, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1949).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Some have suggested that the emphasis should be shifted from considerations of
"arising out of' to "in the course of" employment. 14 Under this view the victim, re-
gardless of whether he was the instigator, should recover if by ordinary course of em-
ployment standards his horseplay did not amount to a substantial deviation from the
employment. If the horseplay involves only a slight deviation from the assigned task
there is no reason for considering the worker outside the course of his employment; if
he is within the course of employment the accident can be said to arise out of his
employment, for it is the nature of the employment that gives rise to the horseplay.15
In East Ohio Gas Co. v. Coe16 an employee sustained injury while scuffling with a fellow
employee. The court said that the "natural playful impulse" did not defeat recovery
because "a friendly scuffle may be an occurrence incidental to the conduct of the
business. To deny compensation because of employee's negligence would be contrary
to the spirit of Workmen's Compensation legislation."lT
Before ascertaining whether the accident was in the course of and arising out of the
employment, the underlying consideration should be the concept of employment.' 9 The
worker should not be viewed merely as an unemotional, insensitive machine. He does
not shed his personality and psychological makeup at the punch of a time clock. As
expressed by Judge Rutledge,
Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they
carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take
along also their tendencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional
make-up. In bringing men together, work brings these qualities together, causes
frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-
making, and emotional flare-up. Work could not go on if men became automatons
repressed in every natural expression.20
If the present court had conceived of "employment" in the light of man plus job,
then it certainly could not have denied compensation to the widow of the deceased
workingman. Under this realistic concept of employment, the decedent would have
been considered in the course of his employment, for any minor deviation from the
assigned task should be "realistically viewed by both the employer and employee as a
normal incident of the employment relation and ought not in this day be viewed as
legally breaching the course thereof." 21 Thus, the realization of the human concept of
employment would obviate the difficulty in interpreting the twin requirements of "in
the course of" and "arising out of" employment to recover under most statutes.
In order to achieve fuller conformity with the purpose and goal of Workmen's
Compensation legislation, the mechanical concept of the working man should be
abandoned in favor of a more realistic view of "man on the job." An employer hires not
a robot but a man clothed with all the attributes and frailties of humanity. If we are to
continue to have men in factories we must realize that the factory environment tends to
emphasize the "natural tendencies" Justice Rutledge spoke of in Cardillo, not to mini-
mize or obliterate them. A realistic acceptance of these facts by the courts would be a
long step towards achieving the ideal of Workmen's Compensation Legislation.
Thomas A. McNish
14 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 355 (1952).
15 See Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12 (1955).
16 42 Ohio App. 334, 182 N.E. 123 (1932).
17 Id. at 125; accord, VfcCoy v. Spriggs, 102 Pa. Super. 500, 157 Ati. 523 (1931).
18 236 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
19 W. VA. CODE Ch. 23, art. 4, § 1 (1955). Instead of the usual "arising out of" the statute
reads "resulting from."
20 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
21 Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12, 16 (1955).
